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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of real estate prices on productive investment. We build a 
simple theoretical framework of firms’ investment with credit rationing and real estate collateral. 
We show that real estate prices affect firms’ borrowing capacities through two channels. An 
increase in real estate prices raises the value of the firms’ pledgeable assets and mitigates the 
agency problem characterizing the creditor-entrepreneur relationship. It simultaneously cuts the 
expected profit due to the increase in the cost of inputs. While the literature only focuses on the 
first channel, the identification of the second channel allows for heterogeneous effects of real 
estate prices on investment across firms. We test our theoretical predictions using a large French 
database. We do find heterogeneous effects of real estate prices on productive investment 
depending on the position of the firms in the sectoral distributions of real estate holdings. Our 
preferred estimates indicate that a 10% increase in real estate prices causes a 1% decrease in the 
investment rate of firms in the first decile of the distribution but a 6% increase in the investment 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
In this paper, we estimate the effect of real 
estate prices on productive investment (i.e., 
machines, equipment and intangible assets), 
focusing on potential heterogeneous impacts 
depending on the composition of the firms' 
assets. We first formalize the link between real 
estate prices and productive investment in a 
context where credit markets are frictional 
thanks to a partial equilibrium model, we then 
bring our theoretical predictions to the data to 
show that an increase in local real estate prices 
hinders the investment of firms that do not 
benefit from a collateral channel. 
From the late nineties to the financial crisis, 
real estate prices in many advanced countries 
have experienced a boom, unprecedented in 
size and duration. This has led to question the 
impact of this boom on productive investment. 
In countries where a bust has followed the 
boom like Spain, the adjustment revealed a 
significant capital misallocation and led to a 
rebalancing towards the exporting sector 
(Cette, Fernald and Mojon, 2016). On the 
contrary, in France, real estate prices did not 
correct significantly and remained higher than 
in the nineties relative to consumer or 
equipment prices. Yet, France is also subject to 
questioning about the impact of the real estate 
prices boom on sectoral allocation and on 
productive investment (Askenazy, 2016): did 
the real estate boom alter the allocation of 
investment towards less productive sectors or 
firms?  
The literature has focused so far on the 
collateral channel that connects real estate 
prices to productive investment. In an 
imperfect credit market, collateral pledging 
enhances the firms' borrowing capacities. The 
ability of the lenders to seize pledged collateral 
increases the debt capacity of the borrowers as 
it mitigates the agency problem in this external 
financing relationship. The extent to which the 
borrowing constraint is relaxed by collateral 
pledging depends on the collateral liquidation 
value. 
In these empirical studies, real estate prices are 
regarded as mere shifters of the pledgeable 
assets' value which determines the borrowing 
capacities of firms. Yet, an increase in real 
estate prices surely raises the value of the 
pledgeable assets and mitigates the agency 
problem but it simultaneously lowers the profit 
due to the increase in the cost of inputs.  
In order to formalize the causal impact of real 
estate prices on productive investment, we 
propose a simple partial equilibrium model of 
investment subject to a credit rationing that 
results from moral hazard and where real 
estate assets are both pledged and used as an 
input in the production process. In this model, 
a representative firm optimally chooses its 
level of investment subject to an endogenous 
borrowing constraint that is derived from the 
incentive compatibility (between the lender 
and the borrower) and the lender rationality 
constraints. When the endogenous borrowing 
capacity is binding, we show that the sign and 
the magnitude of the effect of real estate prices 
on investment are determined by the volume of 
real estate holdings of the firm. When prices 
increase, firms owning few real estate assets 
suffer from a negative profit channel without 
significantly benefiting from a positive 
collateral channel; conversely, firms owning 
more real estate assets face a less stringent 
profit channel and amply benefit from the 
collateral channel.  
Figure: The heterogeneous effects of real 
estate prices on corporate investment: real 
estate holdings are the key determinant
 
Notes: This graph plots the estimates of the coefficients 
associated with the log value of local real estate prices 
for the different deciles of real-estate holdings when the 
dependent variable is the productive investment rate. 
Sources: Fiben, INSEE and authors' computation. 
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We use a large French firm database to 
confront these predictions with the data. 
France is a particularly relevant case to test 
these theoretical predictions as it experienced 
both a very steep, and yet uncorrected increase 
in real estate prices.  
We contribute to the existing literature by 
showing that the sign and the magnitude of the 
effect of real estate prices on productive 
investment are driven by real estate holdings. 
We notably show that real estate prices have 
heterogeneous effects on productive 
investment depending on the position of the 
firms in the 2-digit sectoral distributions of a 
normalized measure of real estate holdings 
(see the graph presented above). We find a 
negative impact of an increase in real estate 
prices on productive investment at the bottom 
of the distribution, while the effect is highly 
positive at the upper end of the distribution. 
Our preferred estimates indicate that a 10% 
increase in real estate prices causes a 1% 
decrease in the investment rate of firms in the 
first decile of the distribution but a 6% 
increase in the investment rate of firms 
belonging to the last decile. Our empirical 
results also suggest that the impact of an 
increase in real estate prices on aggregate 
productive capital is positive. The documented 
heterogeneous effects across firms could link 
real estate prices dynamics to suboptimal 
allocation of inputs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRIX DE L’IMMOBILIER ET INVESTISSEMENT DES ENTREPRISES :  
THÉORIE ET ÉLÉMENTS DE PREUVE EMPIRIQUE DES EFFETS HÉTÉROGÈNES 
RÉSUMÉ 
Dans cet article, nous étudions les effets des prix de l’immobilier sur l’investissement productif 
des entreprises. Nous proposons un cadre théorique simple qui permet de rendre compte de 
l’investissement des entreprises en présence de contraintes de crédit fondées sur le collatéral 
immobilier. Nous montrons que les prix de l’immobilier influent sur la capacité 
d’investissement des entreprises via deux canaux. Une hausse des prix accroit la valeur de 
marché de l’actif collatéralisable et atténue les effets du problème de type principal-agent qui 
caractérise la relation entre le créditeur et l’entrepreneur. Simultanément, cette hausse diminue 
le profit attendu du fait de l’accroissement du coût d’un facteur de production. Alors que la 
littérature s’est principalement intéressée à ce premier canal, l’identification du second met en 
lumière l’effet potentiellement hétérogène de la dynamique des prix de l’immobilier sur 
l’investissement des entreprises. En mobilisant une base de données d’entreprises françaises, 
nous trouvons des effets hétérogènes des prix de l’immobilier sur l’investissement des 
entreprises selon leur position dans la distribution sectorielle du niveau de détention d’actifs 
immobiliers. Une hausse de 10 % des prix de l’immobilier induit une baisse de 1 % du taux 
d’investissement des entreprises situées dans le premier décile alors que cette même hausse 
accroît de 6 % le taux d’investissement des entreprises situées dans le dernier décile. 
Mots-clés : Investissement des entreprises, prix de l’immobilier, canal du collatéral, contrainte 
financière. 
Les Documents de travail reflètent les idées personnelles de leurs auteurs et n'expriment pas 
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1 Introduction
This paper estimates the effect of real estate prices on productive investment (i.e., machines,
equipment and intangible assets), focusing on potential heterogeneous impacts depending
on the composition of the firms’ assets.
From the late nineties to the financial crisis, real estate prices in many advanced coun-
tries have experienced a boom, unprecedented in size and duration. These booms led to
significant capital misallocation across sectors and firms (Cette, Fernald, and Mojon, 2016).
In France, despite a decrease during the crisis, the price level remains much higher than in
the nineties relative to consumer or equipment prices and the question is raised as to the
impact of the real estate prices boom on sectoral allocation and on productive investment
(Askenazy, 2013).
While the literature has focused on the collateral channel of real estate prices, with
monotonous effects on investment, we take into account both this collateral channel and
a factor cost channel, which yield heterogeneous effects of real estate prices on produc-
tive investment of credit-constrained firms. These results are theoretically formalized and
substantiated by empirical analyses performed on a large French firm-level database. We
show that both the sign and the magnitude of their effect depend on the firms’ real estate
holdings.
In an imperfect credit market, collateral pledging enhances the firms’ borrowing capaci-
ties. The ability of the lenders to seize pledged collateral increases the debt capacity of the
borrowers as it mitigates the agency problem in this external financing relationship (Berger
and Udell, 1990). The extent to which the borrowing constraint is relaxed by collateral
pledging depends on the collateral liquidation value. Real estate assets often constitute
the bulk of the firms’s pledgeable assets since they are easily redeployable and have a long
lifespan. Collecting data on the financing behavior of 91 banks in 45 countries, Beck,
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2008) find that more than three-quarters of banks re-
quire collateral to make business loans and that real estate is the most frequently accepted
type of collateral for business lending, regardless of firms’ size. Through this mechanism,
an increase in real estate prices is expected to relax the firms’ borrowing constraint and to
ease their funding.
The role of this collateral channel has been extensively discussed in the literature on
macroeconomic fluctuations. For instance, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show how the inter-
action between credit limits and asset prices is a powerful transmission mechanism which
explains large and persistent comovements in output and asset prices through investment
dynamics. Recent macroeconomic contributions have shed light on the link between land
prices and business investment. Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) develop a macroeconomic model
where land is used as a collateral by credit constrained firms. When they estimate their
model on aggregate US data, they find that the joint dynamics of land prices and invest-
ment is an important mechanism that amplifies and propagates macroeconomic fluctuations.
Kaas, Pintus, and Ray (2014) also provide empirical evidence of such a mechanism using
aggregate data from France.
The positive causal relationship between real estate prices and corporate investment,
channeled by the collateral value, has also been empirically examined using firm-level data.
Based on a large sample of publicly-listed firms in Japan, Gan (2007) finds a significant
impact of collateral value on corporate investment during the five-year period after the
land price collapse which occurred in the early 1990s. Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012)
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(hereafter CST ) study the sensitivity of investment to real estate collateral value by using
data from a sample of US publicly-listed firms observed between 1993 and 2007. They
find a substantial causal relationship between collateral value and business investment at
the firm level. In a recent contribution focusing on labor market variables, Chaney, Sraer,
and Thesmar (2013) document a significant real estate collateral channel by considering a
large database of French firms observed over the period 1998-2007. Interestingly enough,
Wu, Gyourko, and Deng (2015) find no evidence of such a mechanism for Chinese firms,
suggesting that the transmission mechanism from real estate prices to corporate invest-
ment essentially works through credit market frictions. Indeed, the authors argue that the
collateral channel may be altered in the Chinese case by the role played by state-owned
enterprises and government-controlled banks.
In these empirical studies, real estate prices are regarded as mere shifters of the pledge-
able assets’ value which determines the borrowing capacities of firms. This view relies on
the credit rationing mechanism, put forward by Hart and Moore (1990) and built around
the idea that, because loan agreement can be renegotiated and the entrepreneur is required
for the completion of the project, the borrowing capacity only depends on the anticipated
liquidation value of the asset that the lender can seize. In this framework, asset prices have
an unambiguous positive effect on the borrowing capacities of firms.
Yet, when as a result of the agency problem characterizing the creditor-entrepreneur
relationship, the borrowing capacity is determined by the expected value of pledged assets
along with the expected firms’ profit (Tirole, 2010), real estate prices have an equivocal
impact on borrowing capacities. Indeed, real estate prices draw the two components of this
borrowing capacity in opposite directions: an increase in real estate prices raises the value
of the pledgeable assets and mitigates the agency problem but it simultaneously lowers their
profit due to the increase in the cost of inputs.
In order to formalize the link between real estate prices and productive investment,
we propose a simple partial equilibrium model of investment subject to a credit rationing
that results from moral hazard and where real estate assets are both pledged and used as
an input in the production process. When investment is determined by the endogenous
borrowing capacity, we show that the sign and magnitude of the effect of real estate prices
on investment are determined by the volume of real estate holdings of the firm. When prices
increase, firms owning few real estate assets suffer from a negative profit channel without
significantly benefiting from a positive collateral channel; conversely, firms owning more
real estate assets face a less stringent profit channel and amply benefit from the collateral
channel.
We use a large French firm database to confront these predictions with the data. France
is a particularly relevant case to test these theoretical predictions as it experienced both a
very steep, and yet uncorrected increase in real estate prices, while it registered growing
signs of misallocations, in particular through increasing productivity dispersion across firms
(Cette, Corde, and Lecat, 2017). When estimating the effect of real estate prices on produc-
tive investment, we face an identification issue resulting from the fact that real estate prices
comove with the business cycle. More specifically, we know that the level of bank credits af-
fect both investment and real estate prices (Mora, 2008 and Favara and Imbs, 2015). Thus,
real estate prices are correlated with investment opportunities. Following Case, Quigley,
and Shiller (2005) and CST , our identification strategy is twofold. First, we analyze the
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effect of real estate prices at the de´partement level1 on investment, which is not necessar-
ily limited to the de´partement boundaries. Large firms operating at the national level are
expected to face similar economic conditions but their borrowing capacities follow different
paths depending on the dynamics of local real estate prices, namely in the de´partement
where the firms’ real estate assets are located. Second, within a de´partement where firms
face the same local economic conditions and thus similar investment opportunities, we can
compare the impact of real estate prices on productive investment across firms with varying
level of real estate holdings.
We contribute to the existing literature by showing that, in accordance with the results
derived from a theoretical model with an endogenous borrowing constraint taking into
account firms’ profit, the sign and magnitude of the effect of real estate prices on productive
investment are determined by real estate holdings. In particular, we show that real estate
prices have heterogeneous effects on productive investment depending on the position of the
firms in the 2-digit sectoral distributions of a normalized measure of real estate holdings.
We find a negative impact of an increase in real estate prices on productive investment at
the bottom of the distribution, while the effect is highly positive at the upper end of the
distribution. Our preferred estimates indicate that a 10% increase in real estate prices causes
a 1% decrease in the investment rate of firms in the first decile of the distribution but a 6%
increase in the investment rate of firms belonging to the last decile. Our empirical results
also suggest that the impact of an increase in real estate prices on aggregate productive
capital is positive. Nevertheless, the documented heterogeneous effects across the real estate
holdings distribution could link real estate prices dynamics to misallocation of capital.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a tool model from which we derive
our main testable predictions. Section 3 presents data sources and variables. Section 4
reports and comments our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 A simple theoretical framework
We develop a simple model of firms’ productive investment with credit rationing and real
estate collateral in the spirit of the one proposed by Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009).
Nevertheless, we introduce two substantial changes that alter the effect of real estate prices
on the productive investment of credit-constrained firms. First, we consider an alternative
micro-founded borrowing constraint based on the moral hazard mechanism puts forward by
Tirole (2010). Second, we treat real estate assets as inputs in the firms’ production process.
2.1 Model setup
In this model, we consider a risk-neutral representative Firm (the “Entrepreneur” or “Bor-
rower”) in a small open economy ; the risk free interest rate is r > 0. The Firm is assumed
to have a finite horizon and the model has only two dates that correspond to the beginning
and the end of a period.
At the beginning of the period, the representative Firm is endowed with capital k0,
cash-flow c0 (in units of capital), outstanding debt B0 (in units of capital) owing to an
external investor, and R0 real estate units. The net debt is defined as the outstanding debt
1A de´partement is an administrative zone. There are 95 de´partements in France. Each of them has
approximately the same geographical size (6, 000 square kilometers), but different population sizes.
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minus the cash-flow, hence NB0 = B0 − c0.2 The Firm can invest at the beginning of the
period in a project that yields gross revenue y(k,R, θ) at the end of the period; k is the
Firm’s capital made of the initial capital and the investment, hence k = k0 + i where i is
the investment at the beginning of the period; R is the amount of real estate units used by
the Firm and θ is the Firm’s productivity, with θ ∈ [θ, θ¯].3 The revenue function is twice
differentiable, increasing with k, R and θ, and concave with k, R and θ. Capital and real
estate are also assumed to be partially substitutable and therefore ykR > 0.
The Firm must choose at the beginning of the period the amount of real estate units
used in its production process. To modulate the real estate facilities, the Firm has access
to a perfectly competitive real estate market and contracts with an outside risk-neutral
counterpart either to rent or to lend real estate units. We denote rl the renting cost of one
unit of real estate over the period; a simple no-arbitrage condition gives rl = rp, where p is
the market price of one real estate unit (in units of capital), with p ∈ [p, p¯].4 The function
cre denotes the Firm’s real estate cost paid at the end of the period. Note that these real
estate costs can also be thought as the user cost of real estate capital of a Firm that borrows
at the risk free interest rate. From what precedes, we have cre(R) = rp(R−R0).
At the end of the period, the Firm is liquidated. The liquidation value corresponds to
the market value of the real estate assets as we assume that k has no outside value.
2.2 Credit rationing
The Firm may need external financing if the initial cash-flow is insufficient to finance in-
vestment. The Firm can contract with a deep-pocket, risk-neutral external Investor (or
“the Lender”); the Lender behaves competitively in the sense that the loan, if any, makes
no profit. A financing contract specifies two transfers (b0; b1) ∈ R2 from the Firm to the
Investor; b0 occurs at the beginning of the period and b1 at the end of the period. They
satisfy the condition b0 +
b1
1+r ≥ B0.5
An essential feature of our model is that the Firm faces credit rationing. Some profitable
investments may not receive funding. This credit rationing is driven by the asymmetry of
information between borrowers and lenders. The mechanism of credit rationing that we
introduce is similar to the one set forth by Tirole (2010). The Lender faces an agency
problem as the Firm (or “the Borrower”) may mismanage the project. The Borrower can
either “behave” or “misbehave”. Behaving yields the above-described revenue y and no
private benefit to the Firm. Misbehaving generates a private benefit S > 0 (measured in
units of capital) to the Entrepreneur that can be interpreted as disutility of effort saved
by the Entrepreneur when shirking. This private benefit damages the profitability of the
project and induces a fixed loss compared to the optimal revenue; the project yields y − L
when the Entrepreneur misbehaves. It is inefficient in the sense that the private benefit to
2We assume k0 ∈ [0, k¯0]; c0 ∈ [0, c¯0];B0 ∈ [0, B¯0] and R0 ∈ [0, R¯0]. Restrictions on the value of B¯0 are
discussed below.
3We introduce the Firm’s productivity in this model because the literature on agglomeration economies
has documented the link between local spatial density and productivity (see Combes and Gobillon, 2014 for
a recent survey). Introducing productivity in this model renders explicit that changes in productivity can
partially offset the effects of prices on factors’ demand when productivity and prices comove.
4An implicit hypothesis behind this renting rate is that there is no expected capital gain or loss.
5In order to discard any case of inevitable default, we assume that the net present value of the Firm is posi-
tive even if there is no initial investment. it implies an upper bound for B0, i.e, B0 ≤ c0+ y(k0,R,θ)−cre(R)+pR01+r
or equivalently, NB0 ≤ y(k0,R,θ)−cre(R)+pR01+r .
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the Firm is smaller than the foregone revenue (i.e., S < L) but, as this private benefit is
not shared with the Investor conversely to the revenue, the Firm may prefer to misbehave.
We assume that their values are known by both agents. Consequently, to ensure that the
Firm will not shirk, the loan agreement between the Firm and the Investor (to be defined
below) must secure a sufficient stake in the outcome of the project to the Firm. Thus, the
project’s income cannot be fully pledged to the outside Investor and a project may not
receive financing even if the expected profit, when the Firm behaves, exceeds the required
investment plus the interest expenses.
In order to enhance its borrowing capacity, the Firm pledges collateral. We focus our
analysis on real estate collateral as we have set the outside value of used capital to 0. The
value of collateralizable assets corresponds to the market value of the real estate assets, that
is pR0. The financing contract between the Firm and the Investor stipulates how the profit
is shared as well as a contingent right for the investor to seize the real estate collateral. A
share ϕ of the profit goes to the Firm and a share 1−ϕ goes to the investor in order to pay
back the loan and its interests. If the Firm defaults on the loan, that is to say if the Firm
is not in a position to transfer a amount b1 satisfying the above-mentioned condition, the
investor seizes the collateral and the Firm losses the collateral pledged.6
We assume that L is large enough in comparison to S so that there is no profitable
investment in case of a misbehavior:
(y − cre − L+ S)− (1 + r)i < 0 (1)
Making this assumption, we insure that the project is funded if and only if the incentive
scheme is designed so that the Entrepreneur behaves. Indeed, equation (1) implies:
[(1− ϕ)(y − cre − L)− (1 + r)(i− c0 +B0)] + [ϕ(y − cre − L) + S − (1 + r)c0] < 0 (2)
In the inequality (2), when the second term within square brackets - the profit to the
Firm in case of a misbehavior minus the future value of initial cash - is positive, the first
term within the square brackets - the profit to the Lender in case of a misbehavior minus
the future value of outstanding debt - is negative. Shirking entails defaulting and thus no
loan that gives an incentive to the Firm to misbehave will be granted.
From the loan agreement’s structure, we derive an incentive compatibility constraint
stating that the share of the profit going to the Firm must insure that the entrepreneur is
better off behaving:
ϕy ≥ ϕ(y − L) + S − pR0 (3)
This incentive constraint defines a lower limit for ϕ; we denote this limit ϕ = S−pR0L .
The private benefit being smaller than the foregone revenue we have ϕ < 1. The sign of ϕ,
that is to say the sign of S−pR0, is crucial as it determines whether or not credit rationing
can arise. If S − pR0 is negative, that is if the private benefit derived from shirking is
lower than the market value of pledged collateral, the Borrower has no incentive to default,
6Even if the default is contemplated because it affects the incentives of the borrower, it has to be noticed
that the default never occurs in this model as the loan agreement is designed to discard it (see the conditions
introduced below). In this context, a contract where the share ϕ would depend on the Firm’s behaviour can
overcome the agency problem; nonetheless we can easily think of information constraints (e.g. idiosyncratic
income shocks) that would render such a contract unfeasible.
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regardless of the share of the profit he can secure. The Investor is thus in a position to
claim the entire profit for the reimbursement of the loan and its interests, and any profitable
project is funded. Conversely, if S − pR0 is positive, depending on the share of the profit
that the Firm secures, the Entrepreneur may be better off defaulting and credit rationing
can arise as the Lender cannot claim the entire profit to reimburse the loan and its interests.
We derive the borrowing constraint when ϕ ∈ (0, 1). The Lender’s rationality constraint
implies that the share of the profit he secures through the loan agreement is higher than
the amount of outstanding debt:
(1− ϕ)(y − cre) ≥ (1 + r)(B0 − b0) (4)
Incorporating the incentive compatibility constraint, equation (3), into the Lender’s
rationality constraint, equation (4) gives the following borrowing constraint:7
L− S + pR0
L
(y(k,R, θ)− rp(R−R0)) ≥ (1 + r)(B0 − b0) (5)
The real estate prices affect the credit limit through two channels potentially going in
opposite directions. An upward change in the real estate prices increases the market value
of the collateral which raises the cost associated with a default and makes it possible for
the Lender to secure a higher share of the profit. Simultaneously, if R is higher than R0,
the real estate costs increase and cut back the profit.
2.3 Real estate prices and investment
The Firm makes a decision with respect to the investment, the amount of real estate units
used for production and the debt contract in order to maximize the project’s net present
value. If the Firm is unconstrained, its program is the following:
max(i,R,b0,b1) c0 − b0 − i+
y(k,R, θ)− cre(R) + pR0 − b1
1 + r
s.t. B0 ≤ b0 + b1
1 + r
(6)
By contrast, if the Firm is constrained, it is subject both to the borrowing constraint
and to a liquidity constraint at the beginning of the period:
max(i,R,b0,b1) c0 − b0 − i+
y(k,R, θ)− cre(R) + pR0 − b1
1 + r
s.t. B0 ≤ b0 + b1
1 + r
(1 + r)(B0 − b0) ≤ L− S + pR0
L
(y(k,R, θ)− cre(R))
i ≤ c0 − b0
(7)
We are interested in highlighting the predicted impact of a modification in real estate
prices on the Firm’s investment decision in both cases. We first focus on the case where
the Firm is not affected by the borrowing constraint, which is the case when R0 ≥ Sp , or
alternatively when the borrowing constraint is not binding, which is the case if the initial
7Using this borrowing constraint and assuming that the amount of installed capital results from the
Firm’s history, we get another upper bound for the initial amount of the outstanding debt of constrained
Firm, i.e., B0 ≤ L−S+pR0(1+r)L [y(k0, R, θ)− cre(R)].
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cash-flow is big enough to finance the optimal level of investment. This optimal level of
investment, as well as the optimal number of real estate units, are given by the first order
conditions of the objective function in program (6) with re ect to investment and real estate
units:
yk(k0 + i
∗, R, θ) = 1 + r
yR(k0 + i, R
∗, θ) = rp (8)
where i∗ and R∗ denote the first best investment level and the first best real estate units
level, respectively. Let us denote k∗ = k0 + i∗. We differentiate the system with respect to
real estate prices to obtain:
∂i∗
∂p
ykk(k
∗, R, θ) = −∂R
∂p
ykR(k
∗, R, θ)
∂R∗
∂p
=
r
yRR(k,R∗, θ)
− ∂i
∂p
yRk(k,R
∗, θ)
yRR(k,R∗, θ)
(9)
Incorporating the second equation into the first when investment and real estate units
are chosen optimally, we write:
∂i∗
∂p
(
ykR(k
∗, R∗, θ)2
yRR(k∗, R∗, θ)
− ykk(k∗, R∗, θ)
)
= r
ykR(k
∗, R∗, θ)
yRR(k∗, R∗, θ)
(10)
Proposition 1 The investment of the unconstrained Firm is negatively impacted by an
exogenous increase in real estate prices.
Proof. The term post-multiplying ∂i
∗
∂p in the LHS of equation (10) is shown to be positive
in Appendix A. The standard assumptions made on function y allow to deduce that ∂i
∗
∂p < 0.
We can also show that, in the unconstrained case, investment is unaffected by the initial
endowment in real estate units, in initial net debt, i.e., ∂i
∗
∂R0
= ∂i
∗
∂NB0
= 0. The optimal
investment increases with the productivity; ∂i
∗
∂θ > 0.
We now consider the case where the Firm is financially constrained. The constrained
Firm invests less than the optimal investment i∗. The Firm is constrained when it is subject
to a binding borrowing constraint. Investment and real estate units are then given by the
liquidity constraint and the first order condition on real estate units, respectively:
i =
(L− S + pR0) (y(k,R, θ)− rp(R−R0))
L(1 + r)
−NB0
yR(k,R, θ) = rp
(11)
We are interested in deriving the sign of the first derivative of the investment level with
respect to real estate prices, from equation (11) we have:
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∂i
∂p
(
(1 + r)− L− S + pR0
L
yk(k,R, θ)
)
=
L− S + pR0
L
(
∂R
∂p
[yR(k,R, θ)− rp]− r(R−R0)
)
+
R0
L
(y(k,R, θ)− rp(R−R0))
(12)
Incorporating the first order condition on real estate units, we can write:
∂i
∂p
(
(1 + r)− L− S + pR0
L
yk(k,R, θ)
)
= P (R0) (13)
where:
P (R0) =
1
L
(
(2rp)R20 + (y(k,R, θ)− 2rpR+ r(L− S))R0 − r(L− S)R
)
(14)
Proposition 2 The investment of the credit-constrained Firm is positively affected by an
increase in real estate prices if and only if its initial endowment in real estate units is above
a positive threshold R¯.
Proof. We show in the Appendix B that the sign of ∂i∂p is given by the sign of the polynomial
of degree two, P (R0), and that there exists a unique threshold R¯ such that
∂i
∂p ≥ 0 if and
only if R0 ≥ R¯.8
As noted above, an increase in real estate prices has two opposite effects on the con-
strained Firm. First it pushes up the liquidation value the collateral, which relaxes the
borrowing constraint; second, it increases the cost of real estate which negatively affects
the profit and tightens the borrowing constraint. Whether the first or the second effect
dominates is determined by the initial endowment in real estate units.
We can also show that, in the constrained case, ∂i∂R0 > 0,
∂i
∂NB0
< 0 and ∂i∂θ > 0. A proof
of these results is also provided in Appendix B.
2.4 Investment equation and predictions
We build this theoretical model in order to ease interpretation of the results derived from
the reduced form approach adopted in the empirical part.
Denoting h(k0, NB0, θ, R0, p) the policy function for i.
9 We can consider a first order
linear approximation of this policy function around a firm with the median characteristics:
i = h(k0, NB0, θ, R0, p) ≈ γ +∇h(x˜)x˜′ (15)
where x˜ = (k˜0, ˜NB0, θ˜, R˜0, p˜) represents the state variables at their median level, γ is a
constant, and ∇h(x˜) is the gradient of the policy function evaluated in x˜. Hence:
8The relative position of R¯ with respect to S
p
depends on the parameters’ values and the functional form
of y.
9Notice that in the maximization program we can substitute NB0 to B0 − c0 and B0 and c0 disappears.
The investment is thus a function of net debt.
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i ≈ γ + ∂h
∂k0
(x˜)k0 +
∂h
∂NB0
(x˜)NB0 +
∂h
∂θ
(x˜)θ +
∂h
∂R0
(x˜)R0 +
∂h
∂p
(x˜)p (16)
From our model, we can formulate the following predictions:
i a positive estimate of the coefficient associated with the number of real estate units
or a negative estimate of the coefficient associated with the amount of net debt, imply
a rejection of the null hypothesis that all firms are unconstrained;
ii the sign of the estimated coefficient associated with real estate prices is expected to
positively depends on the size of real estate holdings at the beginning of the period if
the sample contains credit-constrained firms.
3 Data
We merge real estate prices at the de´partement level with accounting data on French firms.
3.1 Real estate prices
Corporate real estate local prices being not available in France, we use residential prices.
We find evidence that, at the national level in France, the dynamics of prices in the different
segments of the real estate market, and notably residential and corporate real estate, follow
a similar trend (see Figure 3 in Appendix C).10 We use the Notaires-INSEE11 apartment
price indices built by Fouge`re and Poulhes (2012) which are based on the data collected
by French notaires and the methodology developed by INSEE (i.e., the French statistical
agency). These indices take into account changes in the quality of apartments since hedonic
characteristics of the flats are used to build the indices. The indices in each de´partement
are standardized to be equal to 100 in 2000; de´partement is the smallest geographic entity
for which those indices are available. We introduce geographic variability using apartment
per square meter prices in each de´partement in 2013. Apartment per square meter prices
at the de´partement level are collected by the Chambre des Notaires. They correspond to
the average price per square meter of all apartment transactions registered in a given year.
The Chambre des Notaires de Paris has registered apartment prices in the database Bien
from 1992 onwards and the Notaires de France started to register those prices for the rest of
mainland France in the database Perval in 1994. We retropolate apartment prices using the
apartment price index to build apartment prices per square meter at the de´partement level
from 1994 onwards. Prior to 1994, housing price indices used to retropolate the series
are taken from Friggit (2009). We use the Paris housing price index (available from 1840
onwards) for de´partement located in the Paris area (Ile-de-France) and the national housing
price index (available from 1936 onwards) for the other de´partement. We report the trend
of real estate prices in each de´partement in Appendix C.
Real estate prices at the de´partement level are less precise before 1994. We therefore
start our analysis in 1994. We also restrict our study to firms headquartered in so-called
10CST has also shown, using US data, that commercial and residential prices lead to similar results in
their study.
11Solicitor is the English equivalent for the French word notaire
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de´partement de France me´tropolitaine (mainland France), excluding overseas territories and
Corsica.12
3.2 Accounting data
We exploit a large French firm-level database constructed by Banque de France called
FiBEn. It is based on fiscal documents, including balance sheet and P&L statements,
and it contains detailed information on flow and stock accounting variables. The database
includes all French firms with annual sales exceeding 750,000 euros or with outstanding
credit exceeding 380,000 euros. We exclude from our sample firms operating in finance,
insurance, real estate, construction, mining industries as well as public administration and
social services.
We build productive investment rates, as it is standard in the investment literature
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997 or Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004), by computing the
ratio of productive investment to past year property, plant and equipment stock (hereafter
PPE). Productive investment corresponds to capital expenditure net of real estate acquisi-
tions; real estate acquisitions being approximated by positive variations of the gross value of
real estate assets.13 PPE are deflated as follows. We recover the mean age of fixed capital
by computing the ratio of accumulated amortizations over gross book value and by making
an assumption on the length of the amortization period.14 Using the mean age we get the
average year of acquisition. We then deflate the unamortized fixed capital by the aggregate
deflator of the gross fixed capital formation of the average year of acquisition. We compute
the net debt by subtracting the cash to the total financial debt. We also normalize the net
debt by the PPE stock.
Using firms balance sheet information, we estimate total factor productivity (TFP) as
the residual of a two-factor (fixed capital and labor) Cobb-Douglas production function.15
TFP is estimated separately for each 2-digit sector using data over the period 1994-2013.16
Our preferred measure uses the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
We only keep firms that declare data over at least three consecutive years. Our panel
is unbalanced as firms may enter and exit the sample between 1994 and 2013. We cannot
conclude that a firm exiting the sample has gone bankrupt as it may have merely crossed
the above-mentioned declaration thresholds. Alternatively, it may have been bought by
another firm. The median number of employees per firm is 16 and the median revenue is
2.2 million euros. Further descriptive statistics are provided in Table (1).
3.3 Real estate units at the firm level
A key issue in our study is to recover the real estate units held by a firm every year. We
thereafter define a real estate unit as an apartment’s square meter equivalent. Real estate
12We also exclude firms headquartered in Aveyron, in Lot and in Mayenne as the housing price indices
for those de´partement are based on too few observations at the beginning of the studied period.
13These variations may not exactly correspond to real estate asset acquisition as they may include some
disposals.
14We retain an average amortization period of 10 years; this assumption reflects the fact that fixed capital
is made of both equipments and buildings. Our results are not sensitive to this assumption.
15Total Factor Productivity is here the portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs used
in production. As such, its level is determined by how efficiently and intensely the inputs are utilized in
production.
16We use the NACE 2 classification of INSEE.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables
N Mean S. D. Min Q1 p50 Q3 Max
Sales 1,534,721 10,959 166,779 0 1,275 2,198 4,987 34,608,167
Numbers of employees 1,534,721 56.67 701.75 1 9 16 34 152,586
Productive investment ratio 1,497,095 0.62 1.39 0.00 0.08 0.23 0.58 19.65
NREH 1,532,139 0.47 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 8.88
Net debt 1,487,184 0.60 6.46 -44.69 -0.57 0.34 1.24 80.93
TFP 1,525,543 4.79 0.56 1.76 4.43 4.74 5.11 8.97
Notes: The sales are in thousand euros. The number of employees in full time equivalent. The NREH, in m2 per
thousand euros, is defined below (see equation 18) as the Normalized Real-Estate Holdings. The net debt is normalized
by the PPE stock. The TFP is estimated separately for each 2- digit sector using the method proposed byLevinsohn
and Petrin (2003). Sources: FiBEn.
assets reported in the balance sheet are not mark-to-market. Hence, depending on the
purchase date of real estate assets, the gross value reported in the firms’ balance sheets
corresponds to different amounts of real estate units.
Firms’ balance sheets provide information on gross value of land and buildings and
accumulated amortizations of buildings.17 The mean age of real estate assets is computed
thanks to the ratio of the accumulated amortizations of buildings over the gross book value
of buildings:
Ageit =
AccuAmit
grossBVit
NormAm (17)
where Ageit is the mean age of real estate assets held by firm i in year t, AccuAmit is
the accumulated amortization of buildings, GrossBVit is the gross book value of buildings
and NormAm is the normative amortization period. Assuming that buildings are linearly
amortized over 25 years18, we can deduce for each firm×year observation the mean age of
the real estate assets. For example, if the ratio of amortizations over the gross book value
equals one fifth, we deduce that the mean age of the real estate assets is five years. When a
firm holds both land and buildings, the mean age of land is assumed to be the same as the
buildings’ one. The mean age of the buildings in our sample is around 13.7 years. Notice
that implementing this methodology requires observing price indices from 1969 onwards in
17The gross value of land and buildings corresponds to their historical value adjusted by accounting
reevaluations. We are interested in historical value as we use this historical value combined with the mean
age of real estate assets to recover the number of real estate units held by the firms. We can keep trace
of accounting reevaluations because these operations are offset by dedicated accounts on the liability side -
“reevaluation surplus” for non-depreciable assets and “regulated reserves” for depreciable assets. From these
accounts we compute the total amount of historical reevaluations. Unfortunately, we do not know which
assets have been reevaluated. We thus reallocate the total amount of reevaluations to land and buildings
based on the share of land in the gross non-depreciable assets and on the share of gross buildings in the
gross depreciable assets. This assumption is coherent with the compulsory accounting reevaluations which
occurred in 1976 in France. Overall, these reevaluations have a limited impact on the value of land and
buildings as reevaluations allocated to real estate assets through this method account for less than 1% of
the gross value of real estate assets.
18The accounting standard for the length of the amortization period depends on the nature of the buildings.
Following Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2013), we retain an average length of 25 years.
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each de´partement.19
We do not have precise information on the location of the firms real estate assets. We
use the de´partement where the firms are headquartered as a proxy for the location of real
estate assets. The validity of this approximation is supported by the fact that, given the size
of the median firm in our database, establishments tend to be clustered in the headquarters’
de´partement, and that the headquarters are likely to account for an important share of the
real estate holdings value. Nevertheless, we perform robustness checks by restricting our
analysis to single-establishment firms, that is to say firms for which the assumption on the
real estate assets’ location is undoubtedly trustworthy.
In order to compute the amount of real estate units held by the firms, we divide
the historical value of real estate holdings by the real estate prices in the headquarters’
de´partement at the date when, on average, real estate assets were purchased. We even-
tually obtain, for each firm×year observation, the number of real estate units held by the
firms. We normalize this value by PPE in order to have a synthetic indicator of real estate
ownership which is comparable across firms. We can think of this variable as the number of
square meters per thousand euros of physical capital. It is hereafter called the Normalized
Real-Estate Holdings (NREH):
NREHdit =
AcqREdit
PricedAcqY earit
1
PPEit−1
(18)
where NREHdit is the normalized real estate holdings for firm i in year t and de´partement
d, AcqREdit is the acquisition value of real estate assets, Price
d
AcqY earit
is the price index in
de´partement d in the mean acquisition year20 and PPEit−1 is the PPE stock of firm i in
year t− 1.
The validity of our measurement of NREH strongly relies on the accuracy of the hypoth-
esis made on the length of the amortization period of buildings. The choice of this parameter
can be questioned since the amortization rates depend on the nature of the buildings. In our
baseline analysis we retain 25 years, which corresponds to the rate commonly applied for
office buildings21 and the rate used by Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2013) in their study on
French data. As a robustness check, we estimate our model using NREH series computed
with alternative amortization rates (specifically, 3% and 5% instead of 4%).
We leave out observations whose value is above the 99th and below the 1st percentiles
of the productive investment ratio, the normalized net debt, labor productivity and em-
ployment to PPE ratio. We also leave out observations whose value is above the 99th
percentile of the NREH distribution in order to remove outliers. Main summary statistics
are reported in table 1.
3.4 The distribution of normalized real estate holding
A key result derived from our theoretical approach is that the investment of credit-constrained
firms react differently to real estate price shocks according to the size of their real estate
holdings. We hence examine whether the impact of real estate prices on investment depends
on the position of the firms in the distribution of the NREH defined in equation (18).
19This is the reason why we have extended the series of the Notaires-INSEE indices.
20The acquisition year is recovered by subtracting the integer value of the computed age of real estate
assets to the current year. Thus, the acquisition year is defined as AcqY earit = t− xAgeity.
21See the ruling by the Conseil d’E´tat dated 12 January 1983, number 32728.
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Parameters of the production function may vary over time and across sectors. Indeed,
the median NREH widely differs across sectors (e.g., Figure 1). The ratio of the highest
sectoral median (manufacture of leather and leather products) to the lowest sectoral one
(water transport services) is equal to 9.22 We hence consider sectoral distributions. Besides,
we focus on the distribution of real estate holdings for firms that own real estate assets. We
sort firms holding real estate in the decile corresponding to the position of their NREH
in the 2-digit sectoral distributions in a given year.23 Figure 1 represents the NREH
distribution in the land transportation industry and in the wholesale trade industry.
Alternatively, we may consider distances to sectoral benchmarks.24 This alternative
method does not affect the results reported below.
3.5 The non-real estate-holding firms
In our sample, for 52 percent of the firm×year observations, no real estate assets are reported
in the balance sheet. It might be the case that some real estate assets actually held by firms
are not identified in our database. Indeed, our firm-level data provide information on social
financial statements but we have no information on consolidated accounts at the group
level. Consequently, we do not observe real estate assets held by partially or fully owned
real estate subsidiaries. It may be a source for concern because the practice of gathering real
estate assets into dedicated legal structures is common in France since the beginning of the
eighties. The number of real estate partnerships (Socie´te´s Civiles Immobilie`res, hereafter
SCI) registered in France has soared from c.11,000 in 1978 to c.1.3 million in 2014.
We report in Appendix D the evolution since 1978 of the number of registered SCI.
According to the French notaires benefits associated with this practice range from the ease of
disposals and transmissions to potential fiscal incentives due to tax deductible loan interests.
This measurement issue is more likely to affect NREH at the extensive margin (owning
real estate or not) than at the intensive margin. Indeed, when firms set up dedicated legal
structures to hold real estate assets, they are unlikely to retain real estate assets in their
balance sheets dedicated to their core business activities. Taking this issue into account
would have obliged us to specify a two-equation selection model (for instance, a dynamic
Tobit-2 model) whose identification should have relied on the existence of a valid instrument
affecting the ownership of real estate assets in a given year without affecting the volume of
real estate. We do not have such an instrument. That is the reason why we treat non-real
estate-holding firms separately.
22These statistics correspond to the sample restricted to firms owning real estate assets.
23This approach requires that we accept to discard the few sectors for which we do not have enough
observations for some years.
24We recover the median value of the NREH for each 2-digit sector in a given year. This median can be
viewed as an annual reference level for real estate holdings in each industry. We compute the distance between
each firm×year NREH observation and the relevant sectoral benchmark. We then assign to each firm×year
observation the decile corresponding to the rank of the above-described distance within the distribution of
all computed distances. Using this method, we assume that there exist a unique real estate market.
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Figure 1: NREH sectoral distributions - Two examples
Notes:This figures plot the NREH distribution for all firm×year observations in the land transportation industry
(division 49 in the NACE 2 classification of INSEE)- top panel - and in the wholesale trade industry (division 46 in
the NACE 2 classification of INSEE) - bottom panel. To choose those sectors we have ranked sectors according to
their NREH sectoral median. Among the 25% lowest and the 25% highest values of those medians, we have selected
the sector with the highest number of observations. Sources: FiBEn.
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4 The effects of real estate prices
We analyze the effect of real estate prices on corporate investment at the firm level. Our
empirical analysis is based on our theoretical model.
4.1 Estimating the investment equation
We first estimate the reduced-form equation (16) presented in section 2.4. More specifically,
the estimated investment equation in year t for a firm i headquartered in de´partement d is:
Invit = αi + γt + β1NREH
d
it−1 + β2lnPrice
d
t + β3NetDebtit−1 + β4TFPit−1 + it (19)
where:
• Invit is firm’s i capital expenditure net of real estate acquisitions normalized by the
PPE stock in period t− 1;
• NREHdit−1 is the number of real estate units held by firm i at the end of year t− 1,
normalized by the PPE stock in period t− 1 as defined in equation 18;
• lnPricedt is the logarithm of the real estate transaction price per square meter in
de´partement d in year t;
• NetDebtit−1 is firm’s i total financial debt minus cash holdings of firm i at the end of
year t− 1 normalized by the PPE stock in period t− 1;
• TFPit−1 is firm’s i total factor of productivity in t−1 estimated by using the method
introduced by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003);
As suggested by our theoretical framework, we aggregate financial debt and cash hold-
ings.25 We include firms fixed-effects (hereafter, FE), which are assumed to control for all
the time invariant unobserved firms’ characteristics, and year dummies which control for
economic conditions at the aggregate level. We allow for possible correlations between the
shocks it at the de´partement×year level.26
To validate empirically the theoretical prediction regarding the effect of real estate prices
on corporate investment, we allow real estate prices to have differentiated effects depending
on the firms’ position in the NREH distribution. For that purpose, we introduce interaction
terms between real estate prices and NREH deciles. We estimate the following equation:
25Besides, this specification allows to take into account the fact that firms may contract loans to finance
investment in the accounting period preceding the investment. In that case, an increase in the financial
debt will be positively correlated with investment in the subsequent period. It may hide the fact that higher
leverages lessen firms’ capacity to finance investment. Aggregating financial debt and cash holdings is an
easy way to overcome this issue. Indeed, if proceeds from the loans are not used to finance investment in
the contemporaneous accounting period, they will inflate cash holdings and have no impact on the net debt
(computed as the financial debt minus the cash).
26Interpretations of β1, β2, β3 and β4 are derived from the model. The coefficient β1 is expected to
be positive if the sample contains constrained firms. It reflects the fact that constrained firms can relax
their borrowing constraint through real estate assets pledging. As shown in section 2, the coefficient β2 is
expected to be negative for unconstrained firms and to depend on the amount of real estate units held by
the constrained firms. The coefficient β3 is also expected to be negative if the sample contains constrained
firms. The coefficient β4 is expected to be positive.
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Invit = αi + γt + β1NREH
d
it−1 +
∑10
j=1 β
j
2D
j
it−1lP rice
d
t +
∑10
j=1 λjD
j
it−1
+β3NetDebtit−1 + β4TFP it−1 + it
(20)
where D
j
it−1 for i = 1, ..., 10 is a dummy variable indicating if the firms’ NREH belongs
to the i-th decile of the distribution.
We report in Table 2 parameter estimates of equation (19). Column 1 corresponds to
the OLS estimation of equation (19). The parameter estimates associated with the NREH
is found to be positive. The baseline coefficient is 0.12, meaning that one additional square
meter increases, on average, yearly investment by 120 euros. The estimated coefficient
associated with net debt is negative: each additional 1 euro of net debt decreases yearly
investment by 0.6 cent. The coefficient associated with productivity is positive. These
coefficients are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The estimated coefficient
associated with real estate prices is positive but not significant. Those estimates are con-
sistent with the predictions derived from our theoretical framework. Column 2 corresponds
to the same estimation with year dummies. Introducing year dummies affects the coeffi-
cient associated with real estate prices which now becomes statistically significant at the
5% level. On average, a 10% increase in real estate price translates into a 0.35 percentage
point increase in the investment ratio; that corresponds to 1.5% of the median investment
ratio. Other coefficients remain largely unaffected. Column 3 corresponds to the same
estimation with year×sector dummies. Sectoral dynamics at the aggregate level may affect
the path of corporate investment; these sectoral shocks are captured by the year×sector
dummies. The coefficients remain unchanged. Column 4 reports parameter estimates of
equation (19) for single-establishment firms. The assumption made on the location of real
estate assets (the de´partement where the firms are headquartered) is strong. Nevertheless,
it is unquestionably true for firms operating only in one establishment. Splitting the sam-
ple between multiple and single-establishment firms allows to appraise the importance of
this assumption. Estimates of the coefficients are largely unaffected when we restrict the
sample to single-establishment firms. Columns 5 and 6 explore firms’ behavior depending
on their size; they present parameter estimates of equation (19) for small and large firms,
respectively. Small firms are defined as firms reporting, in the initial observation year, a
revenue below the 25th percentile of revenues in the corresponding year, and large firms
are the ones reporting an initial revenue above the 75th percentile. The estimate coefficient
associated with NREH is higher for small firms than for large firms, and statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level for both samples. Small firms being more likely to be credit
constrained than large firms, this result is perfectly in line with our theoretical predictions.
Also in accordance with our expectations, the absolute value of the estimated coefficient
associated with net debt is higher for small firms. The estimated coefficient associated with
real estate prices is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level for large firms,
and negative and not significant for small firms. The effects of real estate prices appear to
be heterogeneous.
As mentioned above, the group made of non-real estate-holding firms includes also firms
that might own some real estate assets through subsidiaries. Heterogeneity among this
group may bias our estimates. We hence present in Table 3 the same estimates for the
subsample of firms holding real estate assets.
To elaborate on heterogeneous effects of prices on corporate investment, we estimate
equation (20) and report the results in Table 4.
16
Table 2: Real estate holdings, prices and investment behavior - All firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NREH .12*** .12*** .12*** .12*** .16*** .10***
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.005)
Real-Estate prices .01 .035** .029** .034* -.017 .087***
(.006) (.015) (.014) (.018) (.029) (.020)
Net debt -.006*** -.006*** -.006*** -.005*** -.006*** -.002*
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001)
TFP .039*** .038*** .033*** .042*** .073*** .009
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.012) (.008)
Fixed effects:
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year×sector dummies No No Yes No No No
Observations 1,447,299 1,447,299 1,447,299 1,177,846 315,768 410,210
Adjusted R2 .16 .16 .16 .14 .13 .20
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗pvalue < 0.01, ∗ ∗ pvalue < 0.05, ∗pvalue < 0.10.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Notes: The dependent variable is capital expenditure net of real estate acquisition normalized by the PPE stock in
year t − 1. Column 1 is an OLS estimation of equation (19) without year dummies. Column 2 corresponds to the
same equation with year dummies. Column 3 introduces also year×sector dummies. Column 4 reports the estimates
of equation (19) for single-establishment firms. Columns 5 and 6 present the estimates of equation (19) for “small”
and “large” firms, respectively. Sources: FiBEn.
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Table 3: Real estate holdings, prices and investment behavior - Real estate holding firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NREH .17*** .17*** .17*** .17*** .22*** .14***
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.005)
Real estate prices .027*** .057*** .051*** .057*** -.013 .075***
(.006) (.015) (.014) (.019) (.038) (.019)
Net debt -.006*** -.006*** -.006*** -.006*** -.012*** .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002)
TFP .034*** .032*** .029*** .042*** .064*** .011
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.014) (.008)
Fixed effects:
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×sector dummies No No Yes No No No
Observations 696,889 696,889 696,889 565,848 124,394 260,317
Adjusted R2 .18 .18 .18 .16 .15 .20
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗pvalue < 0.01, ∗ ∗ pvalue < 0.05, ∗pvalue < 0.10.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Notes: The dependent variable is capital expenditure net of real estate acquisition normalized by the PPE stock in
year t − 1. Column 1 is an OLS estimation of equation (19) without year dummies. Column 2 corresponds to the
same equation with year dummies. Column 3 introduces also year×sector dummies. Column 4 reports the estimates
of equation (19) for single-establishment firms. Columns 5 and 6 present the estimates of equation (19) for “small”
and “large” firms, respectively. Sources: FiBEn.
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Table 4: Real estate holdings, prices and investment behavior - Heterogeneous effects by
deciles of real estate holding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NREH .11*** .11*** .11*** .11*** .13*** .10***
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.012) (.007)
Real estate prices -.14*** -.048*** -.052*** -.073*** -.13*** -.013
(.015) (.018) (.018) (.022) (.046) (.028)
Real estate prices×dec2 .043*** .046*** .046*** .059*** .081** .032
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.035) (.030)
Real estate prices×dec3 .035** .04** .041** .051*** .048 .032
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.017) (.035) (.030)
Real estate prices×dec4 .056*** .063*** .063*** .089*** .10** .053*
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.040) (.030)
Real estate prices×dec5 .094*** .10*** .10*** .11*** .090** .091***
(.019) (.019) (.019) (.018) (.036) (.030)
Real estate prices×dec6 .12*** .13*** .13*** .14*** .14*** .096***
(.019) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.036) (.028)
Real estate prices×dec7 .16*** .17*** .17*** .18*** .17*** .14***
(.020) (.020) (.020) (.019) (.037) (.028)
Real estate prices×dec8 .19*** .21*** .20*** .22*** .25*** .15***
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.02) (.039) (.029)
Real estate prices×dec9 .25*** .27*** .27*** .27*** .31*** .23***
(.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.043) (.029)
Real estate prices×dec10 .35*** .36*** .36*** .37*** .38*** .31***
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.051) (.033)
Net debt -.006*** -.006*** -.006*** -.006*** -.012*** .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.003) (.002)
TFP .032*** .034*** .032*** .043*** .063*** .014*
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.014) (.008)
Fixed effects:
Decile dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×sector dummies No No Yes No No No
Observations 696,599 696,599 696,599 565,612 124,344 260,218
Adjusted R2 .18 .18 .18 .17 .16 .20
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗pvalue < 0.01. ∗ ∗ pvalue < 0.05. ∗pvalue < 0.10.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Notes: The dependent variable is capital expenditure net of real estate acquisition normalized by the PPE stock in
year t − 1. Column 1 is an OLS estimation of equation (20) without year dummies. Column 2 corresponds to the
same equation with year dummies. Column 3 introduces also year×sector dummies. Column 4 reports the estimates
of equation (20) for single-establishment firms. Columns 5 and 6 present the estimates of equation (20) for “small”
and “large” firms, respectively. Sources: FiBEn.
19
Column 1 reports OLS parameter estimates of equation (20) without year fixed effects.
The coefficients associated with interactions between real estate prices and deciles of the
sectoralNREH distribution exhibit a pattern which is very much in line with our theoretical
results. We observe a monotonic increase in the estimated values, going from negative values
for the lowest decile to high positive values for the highest ones. While the investment of
firms that have few real estate holdings compared to their sectoral peers is slightly negatively
affected by an increase in real estate prices, the investment of those holding more real
estate, relatively to their peers, is very significantly and positively impacted by increasing
real estate prices. Estimated values of the coefficient associated with the other regressors
remain largely unaffected by the introduction of interactions between real estate prices and
NREH deciles into the list of regressors. Column 2 corresponds to the same estimation
with year fixed effects. In column 3, we add year×sector fixed effects. Parameter estimates
are similar for these three specifications. Results from our preferred estimation (column 2)
imply that a 10% increase in real estate prices causes a 0.48 percentage point decrease in
the investment rate of firms belonging to the first decile of the NREH distribution, that is
to say approximately 1% of the mean investment rate in the first NREH decile, but a 3.1
percentage point increase in the investment rate of firms belonging to the last decile, that is
to say approximately 6% of the mean investment rate in the top NREH decile. In column
4, we present estimated parameters of equation (20) for single-establishment firms only.
Estimates are similar to those obtained for the whole sample (column 2, Table 4) except for
the estimated parameter associated with the interaction terms between real estate prices
and the lowest NREH deciles. These results echo estimates reported in columns 5 and 6
which present estimates of the same equation for small and large firms, respectively. The
negative effect of real estate price increases on the investment rate of firms located in the
first deciles of the NREH distribution is much higher for small firms than for large firms.
This could result from differences in the intensity of the borrowing constraint of small and
large firms. Moreover, there may be concern that the increase in the estimated coefficients
associated with the interaction terms could result from the variability of firms’ size across
deciles. The fact that we find the same patterns of results for both sub-samples (namely,
small and large firms) gives credence to the idea that it is mainly the intensity in real estate
holding, namely the NREH value, that matters for predicting the effect of real estate prices
on firms’ productive investment.
Let us examine now the effect of real estate prices on the productive investment of
non-real estate-holding firms.
We first estimate equation (19) on the sub-sample of firm×year observations for which
no real estate asset is reported (column 1, Table 5). Real estate prices are found to be
slightly positively correlated with corporate investment but the estimate is not statistically
significant. Estimated coefficients associated with net debt and total factor productivity
are similar to the ones found for the whole sample and both statistically significant at the
1 percent level. We study further the effect of real estate prices on non-real estate-holding
firms by splitting the firm×year observations into three categories:
• firms that have never reported real estate assets over the observation period (82,599
firms and 634,765 firm×year observations),
• firms that do not report real estate assets in the current period but had reported real
estate assets before (6,637 firms and 37,160 firm×year observations),
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Table 5: Real estate prices and investment behavior - Results no real estate firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real estate prices .012 .031 .001 -.18* -.54*
(.023) (.025) (.09) (.11) (.31)
Net debt -.006*** -.006*** -.013*** -.010** -.021***
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.004) (.008)
TFP .067*** .064*** .094*** .053* .17***
(.008) (.008) (.035) (.029) (.064)
Fixed effects:
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 750,410 634,765 37,160 73,259 37,351
Adjusted R2 .15 .14 .18 .20 .18
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗pvalue < 0.01. ∗ ∗ pvalue < 0.05. ∗pvalue < 0.10.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Notes: The dependent variable is capital expenditure net of real estate acquisition normalized by the PPE stock
in year t − 1. Column 1 reports estimates from the sample made of firm×year observations for which no real estate
assets are reported. Column 2 corresponds to the same estimation on the sub-sample made of firms that have never
held real estate. Column 3 and 4 correspond to firms that don’t report real estate assets in contemporaneous period
but have reported real estate before (column 3) or after (column 4). In column 5, we restrict the analysis to the 3
years preceding the acquisition. Sources: FiBEn.
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• firms that do not report real estate assets in the current period but will acquire real
estate assets afterward (15,598 firms and 73,259 firm×year observations).
Results are presented in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 5, respectively. We observe that real
estate prices do not significantly affect productive investment of the first two categories but
have a negative impact, statistically significant at the 10 percent level, on the last category.
This negative effect of real estate prices on firms’ investment is more pronounced if we
restrict the analysis to the three years preceding real estate acquisition (column 5, Table 5).
These results tend to show that non-real estate-holding firms are rather immune from real
estate prices when they are not considering real estate acquisitions. The negative effect of
an increase in real estate prices on capital investment could result from a crowding-out effect
of planned real estate investment on current productive investments. These results can be
alternatively explained by the above-mentioned measurement issue. More precisely, firms
that initially report no real estate holdings and that, at some point in time, start reporting
real estate assets on their balance sheet are unlikely to be involved in the legal separation of
real estate holdings prior to the acquisition. Hence, even if the legal separation of real estate
holdings blurs the effects of real estate prices for seemingly non-real estate-holding firms,
we nevertheless expect that real estate prices have a negative impact on the investment of
firms that report no real estate assets in the current period but acquire some later.
4.2 Complementary robustness checks
We have identified varying effects of real estate prices on corporate investment depending on
the position of the firms in the NREH sectoral distributions. However, these results could
be biased if real estate holdings were correlated with the sensitivity of investment to local
real estate prices. For example, we would overestimate the effect of real estate prices on
investment for real estate-rich firm if those firms were more sensitive to the local economic
condition. This issue of the sensitivity to local economic condition is partly addressed by
the consideration of sectoral distributions for the variable NREH. Nevertheless, we can
refine our analysis by introducing interaction terms between real estate prices and age,
size or profit margin of the firm in equation (20). Indeed, if age, size or profitability are
correlated with firms’ real estate holdings as well as with firms’ sensitivity to local economic
conditions, the introduction of those interaction terms is required to properly identify the
impact of real estate prices. The estimation results corresponding to this specification are
presented in column 2 in Table 6 whereas column 1 reports our baseline estimates presented
in column 2 in Table 20. Our results are largely unaffected by the introduction of these
interactions terms.
Another possible cause for concern could be that firms invest in real estate asset prior to
investing in productive assets entailing a spurious correlation, possibly varying with the level
of real estate prices, between real estate holdings and subsequent productive investment. In
order to ensure that this mechanism doesn’t affect our results, we present estimation results
of equation (20) with lagged values for real estate holdings (3 and 4 years, respectively) in
column 2 and 3 in Table 6. These alternative specifications tend to alter the precision of our
estimates associated with interacted prices even if we still obtain the same upward trend.
As mentioned above, real estate prices are likely to be correlated with local investment
opportunities. Our empirical strategy relies on the comparison of the investment of firms
facing the same local economic conditions but varying exposition to real estate prices be-
cause of different real estate holdings. The efficiency of this difference-in-difference strategy
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in disentangling the effects of real estate prices on investment from the impact of local eco-
nomic impetus can be assessed by stratifying firms belonging to tradable and non-tradable
sectors. Indeed, firms operating in tradable sectors are less affected by local economic con-
dition while they are similarly affected by the profit and the collateral channels following
real estate prices’ fluctuations. The estimation results of equation (20) for firms operat-
ing in tradable sectors are presented in column 4 of Table 6, results for firms operating
in non-tradable sectors are presented in column 5. The sign and the magnitude of the
estimates associated with prices are similar in the two sub-samples. We also would like
to account for other local economic variables likely to affect corporate investment and to
correlate with real estate prices. Local unemployment rate at the de´partement ’s level are
produced by the INSEE for the whole period studied. We estimate equation (20) adding a
variable corresponding to the local unemployment rate in the de´partement where the firm i
is headquartered in year t. The results are reported in column 7 in Table 6. We obtain an
expected negative and statistically significant estimate for the coefficient associated with
the local unemployment. The other estimates are not altered by the introduction of this
control.27
We do not tackle the issue of attrition because we do not have precise information on
the reasons why firms enter or exit the sample. Nevertheless, to ensure that the moves
in and out of the sample do not affect our results, we estimate our preferred equation
(column 1, Table 7), on a balanced panel in which firms are observed each year from 1994
onwards. Results are reported in column 2, Table 7. Our findings concerning the impact
of prices are robust to this restriction. In columns 3 and 4, we present the results of our
baseline estimation conducted on two subperiods of equal length, 1994-2003 and 2004-2013,
respectively. The estimate associated with the NREH variable increases during the second
half of the observation period, which suggests that firms may have faced fiercer credit
constraint during this subperiod. Columns 5 and 6 report the results obtained when the
amortization rate used to build NREH series is 3% and 5% per year, respectively, instead
of 4% per year in our baseline estimation. The estimates are unaffected, except for the
coefficient associated with the NREH variable. This coefficient mechanically increases with
the depreciation rate as, in a context of an overall sharp increase in real estate prices, the
older the acquisition date the higher the proxied real estate volume. Column 7 corresponds
to the subsample without firms headquartered in Ile-de-France (Paris region) which appears
to be an outlier with respect to real estate prices evolution (see Figure 2 in Appendix C).
Column 8 shows that considering an alternative measure of TFP, that is to say residuals
from simple OLS regression at 2-digit level, has no impact on our results.
4.3 The borrowing capacity channel and other real effects of real estate
prices
In our model, the effect of real estate prices on productive investment of constrained firms
is channeled through changes in the firms’ borrowing capacity; for unconstrained firms, real
estate prices may also affect (negatively) the level of debt if investment is not internally
financed. Hence, we should observe similar results with regards to the impact of the different
explanatory variables on investment and on new bank loans. Unfortunately, the balance
sheet data do not provide information on the new bank loans. We only observe the amount
27In unreported regressions, we find that when we interact local unemployment with the NREH deciles,
none of the coefficient associated with the interacted terms is statistically significant.
23
Table 6: Real estate holdings, prices and investment behavior - Robustness checks I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NREH .11*** .11*** .028*** .012** .09*** .12*** .11***
(.005) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.005)
Real estate prices -.048*** -.14*** -.026 -.016 -.054** -.035 -.056***
(.018) (.019) (.020) (.023) (.026) (.025) (.019)
Real estate prices×dec2 .046*** .041*** .007 -.006 .051** .037* .046***
(.016) (.008) (.016) (.017) (.023) (.019) (.016)
Real estate prices×dec3 .04** .031* .009 .013 .037 .034 .039**
(.018) (.018) (.016) (.017) (.023) (.022) (.018)
Real estate prices×dec4 .063*** .050*** .020 .015 .039* .065*** .063***
(.018) (.018) (.017) (.018) (.023) (.024) (.018)
Real estate prices×dec5 .10*** .086*** .052*** .030* .067*** .11*** .10***
(.019) (.019) (.017) (.017) (.023) (.026) (.019)
Real estate prices×dec6 .13*** .11*** .081*** .049*** .099*** .13*** .13***
(.018) (.019) (.018) (.018) (.021) (.025) (.018)
Real estate prices×dec7 .17*** .15*** .085*** .089*** .15*** .17*** .17***
(.020) (.020) (.017) (.017) (.022) (.028) (.020)
Real estate prices×dec8 .21*** .18*** .12*** .10*** .18*** .20*** .21***
(.021) (.021) (.018) (.018) (.022) (.029) (.021)
Real estate prices×dec9 .27*** .24*** .19*** .13*** .22*** .27*** .27***
(.020) (.020) (.019) (.019) (.024) (.027) (.020)
Real estate prices×dec10 .36*** .33*** .21*** .15*** .28*** .37*** .36***
(.023) (.024) (.020) (.023) (.029) (.030) (.023)
Net debt -.006*** -.006*** -.007*** -.010*** -.005** -.006*** -.006***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001)
TFP .034*** .036*** .043*** .036*** .10*** .001 .034***
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.005)
Unemployment rate -.0077***
(.0027)
Real estate prices×(age, size, profit) No Yes No No No No No
Fixed effects:
Decile dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 696,599 693,734 567,189 499,283 253,635 442,964 696,599
Adjusted R2 .18 .18 .17 .17 .15 .19 .18
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗pvalue < 0.01. ∗ ∗ pvalue < 0.05. ∗pvalue < 0.10.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Notes: The dependent variable is capital expenditure net of real estate acquisition normalized by the PPE stock in
year t − 1. Column 1 is our benchmark result; that is to say column 2 in Table 4. Column 2 is an OLS estimation
of equation (20) where we add interaction terms between real estate prices and the firm’s age, the size of the balance
sheet and the profit margin. Column 3 and 4 present estimation results of equation (20) with lagged values for real
estate holdings (3 and 4 years, respectively). Column 5 reports the estimates of equation (20) for firms operating in
tradable sectors (manufacturing sectors) whereas column 6 reports results for firms operating in non-tradable sectors
(non-manufacturing sectors). Column 7 presents results of equation (20) when we control for the unemployment rate
at the de´partement ’s level. Sources: FiBEn.
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Table 7: Real estate holdings, prices and investment behavior - Robustness checks II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NREH .11*** .11*** .10*** .18*** .057*** .16*** .11*** .11***
(.005) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.003) (.006) (.005) (.005)
Real estate prices -.048*** -.052* -.002 -.11*** -.050*** -.044*** -.094*** -.047***
(.018) (.028) (.035) (.035) (.018) (.019) (.022) (.016)
Real estate prices×dec2 .046*** .019 .024 .047* .041*** .048*** .028 .046***
(.016) (.026) (.032) (.028) (.015) (.017) (.018) (.016)
Real estate prices×dec3 .04** .015 .011 .051 .032** .041** .021 .04**
(.018) (.028) (.037) (.035) (.016) (.017) (.019) (.018)
Real estate prices×dec4 .063*** .011 .059* .093** .057*** .073*** .031 .062***
(.018) (.025) (.035) (.036) (.018) (.018) (.020) (.018)
Real estate prices×dec5 .10*** .058** .078** .17*** .093*** .089*** .059*** .10***
(.019) (.024) (.036) (.038) (.018) (.018) (.019) (.019)
Real estate prices×dec6 .13*** .039* .13** .15*** .11*** .14*** .11*** .13***
(.018) (.022) (.038) (.040) (.020) (.018) (.020) (.018)
Real estate prices×dec7 .17*** .10*** .18*** .22*** .16*** .17*** .14*** .17***
(.020) (.023) (.041) (.042) (.019) (.020) (.019) (.020)
Real estate prices×dec8 .21*** .11*** .23*** .25*** .19*** .21*** .18*** .21***
(.021) (.024) (.043) (.048) (.020) (.023) (.020) (.021)
Real estate prices×dec9 .27*** .18*** .29*** .28*** .26*** .26*** .26*** .27***
(.020) (.023) (.045) (.076) (.020) (.020) (.021) (.020)
Real estate prices×dec10 .36*** .29*** .34*** .37*** .36*** .35*** .36*** .36***
(.023) (.029) (.052) (.051) (.022) (.024) (.025) (.023)
Net Debt -.006*** -.010*** -.002 -.011*** -.006*** -.006*** -.006*** -.005***
(.001) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
TFP .034*** .054*** .026*** .025*** .035*** .034*** .038*** .15***
(.005) (.009) (.007) (.008) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Fixed effects:
Decile dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 696,599 207,692 300,284 396,315 697,243 696,599 586,863 696,599
Adjusted R2 .18 .14 .19 .21 .18 .18 .17 .18
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗pvalue < 0.01. ∗ ∗ pvalue < 0.05. ∗pvalue < 0.10.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Notes: The dependent variable is capital expenditure net of real estate acquisition normalized by the PPE stock in
year t − 1. Column 1 is our benchmark result; that is the column 2 in Table 4. Column 2 reports the estimation of
equation (20) on a balanced panel where all the firms are observed from the year 1994 onwards. Columns 3 and 4
present the estimates of the same equation on two sub-periods : 1994-2003 and 2004-2013, respectively. Column 5
and 6 report the results obtained when the amortization rate retained to build the NREH variable is, respectively,
3% and 5% per year, vs 4% in baseline estimate. Column 7 corresponds to a sample where the firms headquartered
in the Paris area are not taken into account. Column 8 uses an alternative measure of TFP, that is to say residuals
from simple OLS regression at 2-digit level. Sources: FiBEn.
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of outstanding bank loans at each period. The variation in this amount results from new
loans as well as debt repayments. As we can not disentangle those two components, we
consider the positive variation in the amount of outstanding loan as a proxy for new loans.
We estimate the following equation:
∆Debtit = αi + γt + β1NREH
d
it−1 +
∑10
j=1 β
j
2D
j
it−1lP rice
d
t +
∑10
j=1 λjD
j
it−1
+β3NetDebtit−1 + β4TFPit−1 + it
(21)
where ∆Debtit is the difference between the outstanding bank loans in period t and
the outstanding bank loans in period t − 1 if this difference is positive and 0 otherwise
normalized by the PPE stock in period t− 1.
We report the results of the estimation of equation (21) in the first column of Table
8. The estimates of the coefficients associated with interacted real estate prices present
a pattern similar to the one obtained for the investment equation even though the effects
in the last deciles are slightly lower. With the exception of net debt and TFP, for which
we obtain non significant estimates, the signs of the estimates are in line with the theory
and with the results obtained for the investment equations. This result tends to validate
the idea that real estate prices affect investment through their effect on firms’s borrowing
capacity.
The data available also allows to explore the impact of real estate price on real estate
investment and employment. We estimate equation (21) successively replacing the depen-
dant variable ∆Debtit by the real estate investment REinvit, that we proxy by the positive
variation in the gross value of real estate assets, and the employment variation ∆Empit,
that is the percentage change in the FTE workforce in period t. The results are reported
in the second and the third columns of Table 8. The estimates obtained when real estate
investment is the dependent variable markedly differs from the ones obtained with produc-
tive investment. Although the estimates associated with NREH, Net Debt and TFP have
the same signs, these last two are not statistically significant, the estimates associated with
interacted real estate prices present a U-shaped pattern. The positive impact of prices on
real estate investment for the first and the two last deciles are not statistically significant
but the negative impact is statistically significant between the third decile and the seventh
decile. This result suggests that the demand for real estate assets of firms holding few real
estate assets is less price sensitive. The results on employment growth are in line with the
ones obtained for productive investment.
We find that the employment growth of firms located in the first decile of the NREH
distribution is reduced by 0.16 percentage point following a 10% increase in real estate prices
whereas this growth rate is increased by 0.08 percentage point for firms located in the last
decile following the same increase. It is noticeable that the negative impact of a price
increase on employment growth is observed over a larger share of the NREH distribution
(up to the eighth decile) than when the dependent variable is investment.
4.4 Comparison to the existing literature
The existing empirical literature on the real estate collateral channel has highlighted the
amount of additional investment resulting from a 1 euro increase in the value of real estate
holdings. This parameter cannot be easily recovered from the above-presented parameter
estimates because of our estimation strategy aiming at disentangling the collateral channel
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Table 8: Real estate holdings, prices and other real effects
(1) (2) (3)
NREH .063*** .024*** .0024***
(.005) (.003) (.0007)
Real estate prices -.041*** .013 -.016***
(.015) (.011) (.005)
Real estate prices×dec2 .013 -.017 .0006
(.015) (.009) (.003)
Real estate prices×dec3 .003 -.036*** .005
(.017) (.010) (.004)
Real estate prices×dec4 .012 -.045*** .002
(.017) (.012) (.04)
Real estate prices×dec5 .038** -.039*** .006*
(.017) (.011) (.004)
Real estate prices×dec6 .057*** -.031*** .007*
(.017) (.011) (.004)
Real estate prices×dec7 .071*** -.023** .011***
(.017) (.011) (.004)
Real estate prices×dec8 .10*** -.013 .014***
(.019) (.011) (.004)
Real estate prices×dec9 .12*** .009 .017***
(.023) (.020) (.006)
Real estate prices×dec10 .18*** .021 .025***
(.028) (.014) (.004)
Net debt .0004 -.0006 -.0002
(.002) (.001) (.0001)
TFP -.0005 .003 .063***
(.005) (.004) (.005)
Fixed effects:
Decile dummies Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 711,325 711,325 711,325
Adjusted R2 .16 .02 .03
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗pvalue < 0.01. ∗ ∗ pvalue < 0.05. ∗pvalue < 0.10.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Notes: In column 1, the dependent variable is the difference between the outstanding bank loans in period t and the
outstanding bank loans in period t− 1 normalized by the PPE stock in period t− 1. In column 2, it is the difference
between the the gross value of real estate assets in period t and the the gross value of real estate assets in period t− 1
normalized by the PPE stock in period t− 1 and column 3 is the percentage change in the FTE workforce in period
t. Sources: FiBEn.
27
Table 9: Collateral value and investment behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
REvalue .065*** .066*** .066*** .065*** .081*** .058***
(.002) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.005) (.003)
Real estate prices -.041 *** -.021 -.030** -.022 -.071** .023
(.007) (.015) (.014) (.018) (.029) (.020)
Net debt -.006*** -.006*** -.005*** -.005*** -.006*** -.002**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
TFP .041*** .039*** .036*** .044*** .074*** .012
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.012) (.008)
Fixed effects:
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year×sector dummies No No Yes No No No
Observations 1,447,299 1,447,299 1,447,299 1,177,846 315,768 410,210
Adjusted R2 .16 .16 .16 .15 .13 .20
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗pvalue < 0.01, ∗ ∗ pvalue < 0.05, ∗pvalue < 0.10.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Notes: The dependent variable is capital expenditure net of real estate acquisition normalized by the PPE stock
in year t − 1. Column 1 is an OLS estimation of equation (19), where NREHdit−1 is replaced by REvaluedit−1,
without year dummies. Column 2 corresponds to the same equation with year dummies. Column 3 introduces also
year×sector dummies. Column 4 reports the estimates for single-establishment firms. Columns 5 and 6 present the
same estimates for “small” and “large” firms, respectively. Sources: FiBEn.
from the profit channel. Following the identification strategy of CST , we can estimate this
parameter by replacing NREHdit−1 by REvalue
d
it−1 in equation (19) where REvalue
d
it−1
is the value of real estate holdings held by firm i at the end of year t − 1, normalized by
the PPE stock in period t − 1. The results are reported in Table 9. The estimates of the
parameter associated with REvalue indicate that firms invest 0.065 euro out of each 1 euro
of real estate collateral; this result is very similar to the one obtained by CST who found
a baseline parameter value of 0.06 studying US firms over the period 1993-2007. We also
notice that, in these regressions, the effect of local real estate price on productive investment
is unstable across sub-samples.
Another legitimate question relates to the magnitude of the negative effect associated
with an increase in real estate prices for firms that hold few or no real estate asset. The
estimates presented in Table 4 suggest that the median firm located in the first decile
in the NREH distribution lowers its investment level by 1.8% following a 10% increase
in real estate prices. For acquiring firms with no prior real estate holdings, we find a
parameter value suggesting a 4.7% decrease in investment for the same increase in real
estate prices. We propose to analyse these figures using an oversimplify static model where
the Entrepreneur uses a Cobb-Douglas decreasing returns-to-scale technology that uses real
estate assets, productive assets and labor as inputs. The elasticity of productive assets used
in the production process with respect to real estate prices is given by ξ = ιν+ι−1 ; where ι
is the elasticity of output to real estate assets and ν is the sum of the elasticity of output
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to productive assets and the elasticity of output to labor. If we retain the hypothesis that
ν worths 0.8, which is a plausible value for the sum of the elasticity of output to productive
assets and the elasticity of output to labor, then ξ is equal -0.18 when ι worths 0.03 which
happens to be the calibrated value of this parameter in Iacoviello (2005).28 The parameter
ξ reaches -0.47 if ι worths 0.064; which is still a plausible value for ι if we consider the
average ratio of corporate real estate holding over annual output between 1993 and 2013.29
Even if this simple framework does not properly consider the law of motion of capital, it
allows to show that the magnitude of the negative effects of real estate prices on investment
that we find is in line with what we could expect given the share of real estate expenditure
in firms’ output.
4.5 Discussion on aggregate effects of real estate prices
It is widely known that real estate assets can be used to enhance corporate financing. This
generates a channel through which real estate prices affect corporate investment. We have
shown that real estate prices might also affect investment through a profit channel. These
collateral and profit channels pull investment in opposite directions. Using our simple
theoretical model, we have shown that the dominant channel depends on the structure of
the firms’ assets. Our empirical findings support this theoretical prediction. We find that
a rise in real estate prices negatively affects the investment of firms holding few real estate
assets in comparison to their sectoral peers, while a similar rise has a significant positive
impact on the investment of firms reporting more real estate assets than their sectoral peers.
We have highlighted that the reaction of employment to changes in real estate prices present
a similar pattern as that of investment. These heterogeneous effects of real estate prices
may distort the allocation of investment and employment growth across firms and affect
aggregate investment, aggregate production and aggregate TFP. To tackle these questions,
we first provide a further analysis of the firms’ characteristics in each decile and we then
proceed to a quick quantification exercise.
The median age of firms steadily increases with the level of real estate holdings. The age
of the median non-real estate-holding firm is 13 years while the median firm that reports
the highest level of real estate holdings is 28-year old (see Table 10). There is an inverted
Ushaped relationship between the size of the firm (measured as the size of the balance
sheet) and the intensity of real estate holdings. For real estate-holding firms, we observe
a decreasing relationship between profitability (measured as the EBIT30 margin) and the
position in the NREH distribution. However, the median profitability of no real estate
firms is below the median profitability of the whole sample. The relationship between TFP
and the position in the NREH distribution presents similar patterns. Interestingly enough,
the median TFP is lower in the two top deciles of the NREH distribution, precisely the
ones for which we find a sizable positive effect of real estate prices on investment.
Hence, firms which are the most likely to take advantage of an increase in real estate
prices tend to be older, less profitable and characterized by a lower TFP than the median
firm.31Our results reveal a plausible link between real estate prices and aggregate TFP
28The paper is calibrated using US data.
29In our sample, the ratio of the total market value of corporate real estate holding over total annual
value-added is, in average over the 20 years, equal to 2.17. In the national account produced by the INSEE,
this average ratio is 2.07.
30Earning Before Interest and Tax.
31Consequently, an increase in real estate prices tends to give competitive advantage to those firms over
29
Table 10: Descriptive statistics per NREH decile
Med. age Med. size of BS Med. EBIT marg. Med. TFP
No real estate 13 0.9 .051 4.72
Decile 1 13 1.5 .060 4.81
Decile 2 14 1.4 .058 4.80
Decile 3 15 1.5 .058 4.81
Decile 4 16 1.6 .059 4.82
Decile 5 17 1.6 .059 4.82
Decile 6 18 1.7 .059 4.82
Decile 7 20 1.7 .057 4.81
Decile 8 22 1.6 .055 4.80
Decile 9 24 1.6 .051 4.78
Decile 10 28 1.4 .043 4.72
Overall 16 1.1 .053 4.75
Notes: The median age is expressed in year and the median size of the balance sheet in million euros. The EBIT
margin is the ratio of the Earning Before Interest and Tax on Sales. The TFP is estimated separately for each 2- digit
sector using the method proposed byLevinsohn and Petrin (2003). Sources: FiBEn.
growth. If real estate prices foster investment in firms exhibiting low TFP, a rise in real es-
tate prices increases the share of these firms in the economy, putting a drag on TFP growth
through a negative reallocation of inputs across heterogeneous firms. In a recent contribu-
tion, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) highlight a mechanism relating asset pledgeability to
productivity growth in order to explain a negative correlation between the financial sector
expansion and the aggregate productivity growth (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012).
One may also be interested in quantifying the impact of an exogenous increase in real
estate on aggregate investment, aggregate production and aggregate TFP from our esti-
mated parameters. This exercise, based on reduced form estimates, is performed to give a
sense of the magnitude of the economic effects and is not intended to constitute a precise
evaluation.
The impact of an exogenous shock on prices, affecting all firms, on aggregate investment
can be obtained by summing the individual impacts across firms. Let’s denote I the ag-
gregate investment, with I =
∑
i ii,j where ii,j is the investment of the firm i pertaining to
the jth decile in the NREH distributions. We hence have ∂I∂lPrice =
∑
i
∂ii,j
∂lPrice =
∑
i β
j
2ki,j
where βj2 are the estimated coefficients associated with real estate prices in equation (20),
reported in the column 2 in Table 4, for firm pertaining to the jth decile in the NREH
distribution and ki,j is the PPE stock of firms i. Normalizing by I, we obtain the elasticity
of aggregate investment to real-prices prices. From our data, we obtain an elasticity of .14;
the others. In addition, we cannot reject the assumption that corporate loans granted as a result of an
increasing collateral value have crowded out loans available for firms owning less collateral. This could be
a plausible complementary explanation for our empirical results. Such a mechanism relates to the recent
findings of Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay (2014) that booming housing prices in the US have led
banks to reduce commercial lending because of a crowding-out effect resulting from lending opportunities in
the residential housing market.
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meaning that a 10% increase in real estate prices entails a jump by 1.4% in investment. This
translates into a short term elasticity of aggregate capital to real estate prices of .056.32
We now turn to the impact of price shocks on aggregate production. For the sake of
simplicity, we consider a Cobb-Douglas technology that only uses fixed assets and labor
as inputs, that is to say yi,j,s = θi,j,sk
αs
i,j,sl
βs
i,j,s, where the indices i, j, s indicate the firm
i, operating in sector s, pertaining to the jth decile in the NREH distributions. The
parameters of the production function are estimated separately for each 2-digit sector. We
denote Y the aggregate production and Y =
∑
i yi,j,s. The aggregate effect of prices on
production can be recover by summing the impact across firms. It can be shown that
∂Y
∂lPrice =
∑
i(αs
∂ki,j,s/ki,j,s
∂lPrice + βs
∂li,j,s/li,j,s
∂lPrice ) yi,j,s =
∑
i(αsβ
j
2,inv + βsβ
j
2,emp) yi,j,s where β
j
2,inv
and βj2,emp are the estimated coefficients associated with real estate prices, respectively
reported in the column 2 in Table 4 and in the column 3 of Table 8, for firm pertaining
to the jth decile in the NREH distribution. Normalizing by Y , we find an elasticity of
aggregate production to real estate prices equal to .003. This very low elasticity results
from the employment contraction following a price increase for a large share of firms.33
The negative impact of real estate prices on aggregate employment, along with a positive
impact on aggregate investment, cannot easily be accounted for by a model without labor
and housing markets because, in a simple optimal investment model, the link between real
estate prices and employment can only be channeled through the complementarities between
fixed capital and labor. Housing prices and wages being intertwined, an increase in real
estate prices is likely to be associated with an increase in labor costs that has a direct
negative effect on labor demand. Precisely assessing the magnitude of this direct effect is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, we compute the effect of a price increase on aggregate TFP. As mentioned above,
because of its interaction with the credit friction, a price increase may affect allocation of
inputs across firms in a way that damage aggregate productivity. Lets define the share-
weighted aggregate TFP as Θ =
∑
i
yi,j,s
Y θi,j,s. We have
∂Θ
∂lPrice =
∑
i
1
Y 2
θi,j,s(
∂yi,j,s
∂lPriceY −
∂Y
∂lPriceyi,j,s) and we can compute
∂Θ
∂lPrice with our estimates and our database. We find an
elasticity equal to −.004.
Those calculation doesn’t take into account the effect of prices on business creation. A
related literature has highlighted that real estate prices may affect small business creations
and self-employment. Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2015) find that the increase in real
estate prices has enhanced growth in employment by easing small business starts in the US
between 2002 and 2007. Schmalz, Sraer, and Thesmar (2013) combine local house prices
with micro-level data on home ownership by entrepreneurs. They find that the differences
in the size of businesses created by homeowners and renters and the propensity to start a
business are larger in regions where house prices have significantly increased. We do not
address this question in this study even though such mechanisms could also be important.
5 Conclusion
The present paper has investigated the effect of real estate prices on productive investment
through a theoretical framework and an empirical validation on a large French firm-level
32Computations are made with sample made of all real estate holding firms over the whole period.
33Computing the elasticity of aggregate employment to real estate prices, as we do for investment, we
obtain a value of −.009.
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database.
Our theoretical framework models firms’ investment with credit rationing and real estate
assets which can be used as collateral but also as inputs in the production process. Real
estate prices operate through two channels with opposite effects on borrowing capacities of
credit-constrained firms. Through the first channel, an increase in real estate prices raises
the market value of firms’ pledgeable assets and facilitates their access to credit. Through
the second channel, this increase raises the cost of structures, decreasing expected profit
and damaging borrowing capacities. As a result, the impact of an increase in real estate
prices on credit-constrained firms depends on firms’ characteristics, the level of real estate
holdings being the main determinant.
Our empirical analysis has validated our main theoretical predictions. The impact of
real estate prices on productive investment is globally positive, although modest and weakly
robust. Considering firms’ heterogeneity, we do find a negative impact for firms in the lower
part of the sectoral distribution of real estate ownership, and a positive impact in the upper
part. These results suggest that French firms have faced binding borrowing constraints over
the studied period.
Hence, real estate price fluctuations affect resources allocation. Real estate price hikes
tend to favor older and, in average, less productive firms and may have weighed on firms’
overall performance and on the creative destruction process in the bubble years. Future
research could hence focus on the impact of real estate changes on productivity dynamics,
specifically through entry/exit processes.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A: Proof of proposition 1
We know that i∗and R∗ maximize the objective function. Let’s the function V (i, R) denote
the value of the objective function associated with an investment i and a number of real
estate units R. By definition, ∀(g, h) ∈ R2, V (i∗+g,R∗+h)−V (i∗, R∗) ≤ 0. A second-order
Taylor approximation of the function V around (i∗, R∗) gives:
V (i∗ + g,R∗ + h)− V (i∗, R∗) ≈ ykk(k
∗, R∗, θ)
1 + r
g2
+2
ykR(k
∗, R∗, θ)
1 + r
gh+
yRR(k
∗, R∗, θ)
1 +R
h2
(22)
Dividing by h2 we have:
V (i∗ + g,R∗ + h)− V (i∗, R∗)
h2
≈ ykk(k
∗, R∗, θ)
1 + r
g2
h2
+2
ykR(k
∗, R∗, θ)
1 + r
g
h
+
yRR(k
∗, R∗, θ)
1 +R
(23)
We know that, ∀g ∈ R, ∀h ∈ R∗:
V (i∗ + g,R∗ + h)− V (i∗, R∗)
h2
< 0 (24)
Hence we can write:(
2
ykR(k
∗, R∗, θ)
1 + r
)2
− 4ykk(k
∗, R∗, θ)
1 + r
yRR(k
∗, R∗, θ)
1 + r
< 0 (25)
and eventually:
ykR(k
∗, R∗, θ)2
yRR(k∗, R∗, θ)
− ykk(k∗, R∗, θ) > 0 (26)
6.2 Appendix B: Proof of proposition 2
Let F be a function of i, with i ∈ [0, i∗] such that:
F (i) = (1 + r) +
L− S + pR0
L
(y(k0 + i, R, θ)− rp(R−R0))− (1 + r)i− (1 + r)B0 (27)
We get:
∂F
∂i
(i) =
L− S + pR0
L
yk(k0 + i, R, θ)− (1 + r) (28)
And:
∂2F
∂i∂i
(i) =
L− S + pR0
L
ykk(k0 + i, R, θ) (29)
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From the properties of the function y we deduce that; ∀i ∈ [0, i∗], ∂2F (i)∂i∂i < 0. We know
that, in the constrained case, L−S+pR0L ∈ [0, 1]. From the first equation in system (6), we
know that ∂F∂i (i
∗) < 0.
We distinguish two cases:
• If ∂F∂i (0) < 0, we conclude that, ∀i ∈ [0, i∗]:
(1 + r)− L− S + pR0
L
yk(k0 + i, R, θ) > 0 (30)
• If ∂F∂i (0) ≥ 0, we know that there exists a unique threshold i˜ ∈ [0, i∗) such that
∂F
∂i (i) < 0 if and only if i > i˜. The function F is increasing on the interval [0, i˜] and
decreasing on the interval [˜i, i∗]. The constraint on the initial amount of debt, i.e.,
L−S+pR0
L (y(k0, R, θ)− cre(R)) ≥ (1+r)B0, insures that F (0) > 0 and we deduce from
the variation of F that the value i satisfying F (i) = 0 pertains to the interval (˜i, i∗].
Thus, when i denotes the investment in the constrained case, we also have:
(1 + r)− L− S + pR0
L
yk(k0 + i, R, θ) > 0 (31)
We conclude that the sign of ∂i∂p is determined by the sign of P (R0).
The discriminant of the polynomial P is strictly positive and P (0) < 0. We know that
P has a unique positive real root R¯ and we conclude that ∂i∂p ≥ 0 if and only if R0 ≥ R¯,
with:
R¯ =
2prR− y(k,R, θ)− r(L− S) +
√
[y(k,R, θ)− 2rpR+ r(L− S)]2 + 8r2p(L− S)R
4rp
(32)
Note that the relative position of R¯ to Sp depends on the parameters value and the
functional form of y.
The sign of ∂i∂R0 ,
∂i
∂c0
, ∂i∂B0 and
∂i
∂θ can be obtained thanks to the result derived above.
We have:
∂i
∂R0
=
L−S+pR0
L rp+
p
L [y(k,R, θ)− rp(R−R0)]
(1 + r)− L−S+pR0L yk(k,R, θ)
> 0 (33)
∂i
∂c0
=
1
(1 + r)− L−S+pR0L yk(k,R, θ)
> 0 (34)
∂i
∂B0
=
−1
(1 + r)− L−S+pR0L yk(k,R, θ)
< 0 (35)
∂i
∂θ
=
L−S+pR0
L yθ(k,R, θ)
(1 + r)− L−S+pR0L yk(k,R, θ)
> 0 (36)
6.3 Appendix C: Further details on real estate price indices
6.4 Appendix D: Further details on real estate partnerships
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Figure 2: Real estate prices at the de´partement level: 1952-2013
Notes:This graph plots real estate prices in euros (2013) per square meters in each mainland French de´partement.
The series are built with the Notaires-INSEE apartment price indices built by Fouge`re and Poulhes (2012). Sources:
French Notaires, Friggit (2009).
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Figure 3: Real estate prices in France by market segment: 1998-2015
Notes: This graph plots real estate prices in euros per square meters in three market segments: Office, Residential
and Retail. Sources: HCSF report (MSCI).
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Figure 4: The number of real estate partnerships (Socie´te´s Civiles Immobilie`res) incorpo-
rated in France: 1978-2013
Notes: This graph plots the evolution of the number of Socie´te´s Civiles Immobilie`res incorporated in France since
1978. Source: Infogreffe.
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